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ABSTRACT
Attacks on Internet routing are typically viewed through
the lens of availability and confidentiality, assuming an ad-
versary that either discards traffic or performs eavesdrop-
ping. Yet, a strategic adversary can use routing attacks to
compromise the security of critical Internet applications like
Tor, certificate authorities, and the bitcoin network.
In this paper, we survey such application-specific routing
attacks and argue that both application-layer and network-
layer defenses are essential and urgently needed. While
application-layer defenses are easier to deploy in the short
term, we hope that our work serves to provide much needed
momentum for the deployment of network-layer defenses.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Internet is a “network of networks” that interconnects
tens of thousands of separately administered networks. The
Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the glue that holds the
Internet together by propagating information about how to
reach destinations in remote networks. However, BGP is
notoriously vulnerable to misconfiguration and attack. The
consequences range from making destinations unreachable
(e.g., Google’s routing incident caused widespread Internet
outage in Japan [7]), to misdirecting traffic through unex-
pected intermediaries (e.g., European mobile traffic routed
through China Telecom due to improper routing announce-
ments from a Swiss datacenter [10]), to impersonating le-
gitimate services (e.g., traffic to an Amazon DNS server
rerouted to attackers who answered DNS queries with fraud-
ulent IP addresses [8]). Efforts to secure the Internet routing
system have been underway for many years [20,21,23,26,28,
29], but the pace of progress is slow since many parties must
agree on solutions and cooperate in their deployment.
In the meantime, more and more users rely on the Inter-
net to access a wide range of services, including applications
with security and privacy concerns of their own. Applica-
tions such as Tor (The Onion Routing) allow users to browse
anonymously, certificate authorities provide certificates for
secure access to web services, and blockchain supports se-
cure cryptocurrencies. However, the privacy and security
properties of these applications depend on the network to
deliver traffic; Figure 1 illustrates the cross-layer interac-
tion between Tor and the underlying network. Application
developers abstract away the details of Internet routing, but
BGP does not provide a sufficiently secure scaffolding for
these applications. This gap leaves the vulnerabilities due to
routing insecurity significantly underestimated. While rout-
ing attacks are well known, they have been viewed primarily
Figure 1: BGP routing affects who can observe Tor traffic.
as affecting availability (when misdirected traffic is dropped)
and confidentiality (when data is not encrypted). This pa-
per provides a new perspective by showing that routing at-
tacks on Internet applications can have even more devastat-
ing consequences for users—including uncovering users (such
as political dissidents) trying to communicate anonymously,
impersonating websites even if the traffic uses HTTPS, and
stealing cryptocurrency.
This paper argues that the security of Internet applica-
tions and the network infrastructure should be considered
together, as vulnerabilities in one layer lead to broken as-
sumptions (and new vectors for attacks) in the other. We
first give an overview of routing security. Then, we discuss
how cross-layer interactions enable routing attacks to com-
promise popular applications like Tor, certificate authori-
ties, and the bitcoin network. Given the slow adoption of
secure routing solutions, we discuss how applications can
take into account the underlying routing properties and em-
ploy application-layer defenses to mitigate routing attacks.
We believe that application-layer and network-layer solu-
tions are interconnected and both are essential to secure
Internet applications. While application-layer defenses are
more easily deployable, we hope to motivate the commu-
nity redouble efforts on secure routing solutions and tackle
BGP’s many security problems once and for all.
2. ROUTING ATTACKS
Routing attacks occur in the wild, and are getting increas-
ingly prevalent and more sophisticated. We dissect routing
attacks from the perspective of an attacker, and review ex-
isting defenses. In particular, the ability to divert targeted
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Figure 2: AS4 routes traffic to AS1 via AS3 for destination
IPs within 140.180.0.0/24 based on longest matching prefix.
traffic via routing attacks is an emerging threat to Internet
applications. We further demonstrate how routing attacks
compromise three applications in Sections 3, 4, and 5.
2.1 How BGP Works
The Internet consists of around 67,000 Autonomous Sys-
tems (ASes) [12], each with an AS number (ASN) and a set
of IP prefixes.Neighboring ASes exchange traffic in a variety
of bilateral relationships that specify which traffic should be
sent and how it is paid for. Such agreements can generally be
classified into two types: a customer-provider relationship,
where the customer pays the provider to send and receive
traffic to and from the rest of the Internet, and a peer-to-
peer relationship, where no money is exchanged but traffic
must be destined for the peer or its customers.
Routing among the ASes is governed by the Border Gate-
way Protocol (BGP), which computes paths to destination
prefixes. ASes choose one “best” route to a prefix based on
a list of factors, with the top two generally being: (1) Local
Preference: a path via a customer is preferred over path via
a peer, which is preferred over a provider; (2) Shortest Path:
a path with the fewest AS hops is preferred. The AS will
then add the route into its local Routing Information Base,
and further propagate the route to its neighbors based on
routing policies after prepending itself in the path.
ASes forward packets using the path to the longest match-
ing prefix of the destination IP. In Figure 2, AS1 announces
140.180.0.0/22 via neighbor AS2, and 140.180.0.0/24 via neigh-
bor AS3. AS4 forwards packets to 140.180.0.0/24 via AS3
based on the longest prefix match. Note that, in general,
the longest prefix that can be successfully propagated is /24;
many ASes filter prefixes that are longer than /24 by default.
2.2 Goals of Routing Attacks
By default, ASes trust routing announcements from other
ASes. Routing attacks happen when an AS announces an in-
correct path to a prefix, causing packets to traverse through
and/or arrive at the attacker AS. We discuss the goals of the
attacker from two perspectives: whom to affect and what to
achieve.
2.2.1 Whom to Affect
Routing attacks affect two groups of victims: (1) destina-
tions, whose prefixes are announced by the attacker, and (2)
senders, who send packets to the attacked prefixes.
Destinations. YouTube was the targeted destination of
a hijacking incident in 2008, where Pakistan authorities tried
to block access to YouTube [6]. Pakistan Telecom (AS17557)
announced the prefix 208.65.153.0/24, which was a subnet
of 208.65.152.0/22 announced by YouTube (AS36561).
Senders. The attacker can divert global traffic from all
senders on the Internet, or selectively target only traffic from
certain senders. In the YouTube incident above, the goal was
to target only senders within Pakistan; however, the attack
unintentionally affected all senders around the globe.
2.2.2 What to Achieve
Historically, the most visible effect of routing attacks is
outage, where attackers drop packets and make the destina-
tions unreachable. This type of attack that “blackholes” the
traffic is also characterized as a hijack attack.
However, the attacker’s goals can be more sophisticated.
We discuss two examples.
Surveillance. Authorities may use routing attacks to
perform surveillance and target traffic from senders in cer-
tain regions. Intelligence agencies such as NSA could launch
routing attacks to make certain traffic easier to intercept for
surveillance [3]. Traffic from the targeted region would be
rerouted to the authorities, who forward the traffic to the
destinations while monitoring the activities. This type of at-
tack is usually characterized as an interception attack, where
the legitimate destinations still receive the traffic. Intercep-
tion attacks are much harder to notice than hijack attacks
since they do not interrupt the communication, though per-
formance may degrade due to more circuitous paths. Fur-
thermore, authorities could exploit routing attacks to sur-
pass legal restrictions by diverting domestic traffic (e.g.,
emails between Americans) to foreign jurisdictions to con-
duct surveillance [24].
Impersonation. Attackers can impersonate destinations
to deceive the senders by intercepting packets via either
hijack or interception attacks and replying with forged re-
sponses. These attacks can have damaging consequences. In
2018, attackers used routing attacks to impersonate Ama-
zon’s authoritative DNS service [8] and answered DNS queries
for a cryptocurrency website with Russian IP addresses. The
users were then directed to a fraudulent site which they be-
lieved was their real cryptocurrency service. Consequently,
cryptocurrency was stolen. Attackers may also imperson-
ate large number of IP addresses to originate spam or other
malicious traffic [9].
In this paper, we further show routing attacks with more
sophisticated goals, such as compromising applications in-
cluding Tor, certificate authorities, and bitcoin.
2.3 Attack Methodology
Attackers need to decide (1) which prefix to announce, (2)
which path to announce, and (3) which ASes should receive
the announcement.
2.3.1 Which Prefix to Announce
Attackers can announce either (1) a sub-prefix (i.e., more-
specific prefix) of the target prefix, or (2) an equally-specific
prefix same as the target prefix. Note that a less-specific
prefix would not be used in packet forwarding and hence
would not constitute a successful attack.
Affecting global traffic by announcing sub-prefixes.
Since forwarding is based on longest prefix match, sub-prefix
attacks are highly effective at hijacking traffic from all senders.
However, since most ASes filter announcements for prefixes
longer than /24, sub-prefix attacks on /24 prefixes would not
be effective.
Targeting selective traffic by announcing equally-
specific prefixes. An AS that receives both the legitimate
announcement and the attacker’s announcement would pick
Figure 3: AS2 (attacker) announces an equally-specific pre-
fix as AS1 (legitimate destination). AS4 prefers the path
to AS2, while AS3 prefers the path to AS1. Only AS4 is
affected by the attack.
Figure 4: AS2 (attacker) “poisons” the path by appending
AS3 and AS1 (legitimate destination) in the path, which
preserves a legitimate route from AS2 to AS1.
one based on routing preferences. Note that some ASes may
only receive one announcement. In Figure 3, AS2 (attacker)
announces the same /24 prefix as the destination AS1, and
AS4 prefers the path to AS2 while AS3 still prefers the path
to AS1. This attack generally affects only parts of the Inter-
net and does not have global impact. However, it is stealth-
ier due to its local impact and enables targeted attacks on
certain senders.
2.3.2 Which Path to Announce
The attacker may put itself as the origin of the prefix,
which naturally constitutes a hijack attack. Yet, a more
sophisticated attacker has a range of other options.
Evading detection by forging the victim AS. The
attacker can add the legitimate destination AS to the end of
its path, so the announcement has the same “last hop” (i.e.,
“origin”) AS as a legitimate announcement. This makes the
attack stealthier since some defenses (e.g., monitoring sys-
tems and RPKI) only check the origin AS of the announce-
ment instead of the full path. Note that the path now ap-
pears one hop longer, which may reduce the number of ASes
that pick the attacker’s route over the legitimate route.
Interception attack via AS path poisoning. A so-
phisticated attacker can append a set of carefully-selected
ASes at the end of the path. These ASes should constitute
a legitimate path from the attacker to the destination AS.
The appended ASes will ignore the attacker’s announcement
because of BGP loop prevention, which consequently helps
preserve legitimate routes from the attacker AS to the desti-
nation AS. This attack is known as the “AS path poisoning
attack” (Figure 4). This attack is very stealthy and effec-
tive at performing interception attack while announcing a
sub-prefix.
2.3.3 Which ASes Should Receive the Announcement
Instead of sending the announcement to all neighbors, a
strategic attacker may attempt to control who can receive
the announcement to increase attack stealthiness, perform
an interception attack, or target certain senders. We discuss
two techniques to limit announcement propagation.
Announcing to certain neighbors. Attackers may
exploit routing policies to control attack propagation by
only announcing to certain peers and customers. These an-
nouncements will only be propagated “down” to the peer’s
customers, but not to its providers. Consequently, only se-
lected ASes will hear the announcements.
BGP communities. BGP communities are optional at-
tributes that can be added to an announcement to control
routing policies in upstream ASes, for purposes such as traf-
fic engineering. Attackers may exploit BGP communities to
strategically control attack propagation such that selected
ASes will never hear or will not prefer the bogus announce-
ments, and thus increase the effectiveness and viability of
interception attacks [19].
We have so far shown a wide range of techniques to di-
vert traffic to attackers. We will demonstrate how attackers
use the diverted traffic to deanonymize Tor users via traffic
analysis, obtain bogus digital certificates for websites, and
prevent blockchain systems from reaching consensus.
2.4 Routing Defenses
Defending against routing attacks is challenging due to
the lack of “ground truth” to inform whether a path is “cor-
rect”. Seemingly suspicious announcements could be legiti-
mate paths used by ASes to optimize network performance.
Many solutions have been proposed that rely on different
sources of information as “ground truth”.
Anomaly detection via BGP monitoring. BGP mon-
itoring systems detect anomalous routing announcements by
using historical routing data to infer the “expected” origin
ASes or paths for prefixes [25, 27, 30, 34, 39, 40]. They typ-
ically do not require changes to the routing protocol and
hence are highly deployable. However, many early efforts on
monitoring systems focused on catching “easy” attacks (e.g.,
mismatched origin ASes), but failed to detect more sophis-
ticated attacks such as interception attacks. Furthermore,
relying on historical data to infer ground truth is prone to
false positives (flagging legitimate routes) and false negatives
(missing real attacks).
Defensive filtering via preset knowledge. ASes of-
ten perform prefix filtering on announcements received from
direct customers. It is effective against attacks launched by
customer ASes, but does not prevent ASes from attacking
their direct or indirect customers. A more advanced filter-
ing technique is AS path filtering, which uses a whitelist of
paths for announcements received from peering ASes based
on prior information exchange [35]. It extends the knowl-
edge base further from the sole knowledge of an individual
provider on its customers (as in prefix filtering), to a collec-
tive knowledge base exchanged and built among a network
of trusted peers. The MANRS project [13] has outlined best
practices for using filtering techniques to protect the routing
infrastructure.
Origin validation. The Resource Public Key Infras-
tructure (RPKI) is a public key infrastructure that stores
cryptographic attestations, known as Route Origin Autho-
rizations (ROAs), indicating which ASes are authorized to
originate which prefixes [21]. Upon receiving an announce-
ment, ASes perform Route Origin Validations (ROV) to fil-
ter routes originated from invalid ASes. RPKI utilizes cryp-
tographic primitives to make the knowledge base available
to all ASes as opposed to only direct neighbors in defensive
filtering. Even though ROV only validates the origin AS
instead of the full path, it can already be effective at pre-
venting many attacks. However, currently less than 20% of
the prefixes have valid ROAs [4] and even fewer ASes are
correctly performing ROV [31].
Path validation. BGPsec uses cryptographic primitives
to validate the whole AS path [28]. It is an online pro-
tocol, as opposed to a separate offline lookup (like ROV).
Each AS in the path generates a cryptographic signature
which is added to the path as the announcement propagates
through the network. While BGPsec provides validation of
the full path, it places a heavy burden on BGP routers. It
also requires all ASes along a path to participate, making
incremental deployment challenging. We have yet to see
real-world deployment of BGPsec.
In this paper, we provide a new angle into building de-
fenses — in addition to network-layer defenses, applications
can build their own application-layer defenses by taking into
account the underlying routing properties. We also highlight
the importance of deploying defenses against sophisticated
attacks, which are stealthier and effective at compromising
Internet applications.
3. THE TOR NETWORK
Tor is the most widely used anonymity system [22]. It
carries terabytes of traffic every day and serves millions of
users [5]. However, network-level adversaries can deanonymize
Tor users by launching routing attacks to observe user traffic
and subsequently performing correlation analysis. Further-
more, the attacks have broad applicability to low-latency
anonymous communication systems beyond Tor (e.g., I2P
anonymous network or even VPNs).
3.1 How Tor Works
To prevent an adversary from associating a client with
a destination server, Tor encrypts the network traffic and
sends it through a sequence of relays (proxies) before going
to the destination. The client selects three relays (entry,
middle, exit), and constructs a circuit through them with
layered encryption by repeatedly encrypting the next hop
with the keys of the current hops (Figure 5). Each relay
only learns the previous and next hops, and no relay or local
network observer can identify both the source and destina-
tion.
However, Tor is known to be vulnerable to network-level
adversaries who can observe traffic at both ends of the com-
munication, i.e., between client and entry, and between exit
and server. By default, Tor does not obfuscate packet tim-
ings, so the traffic entering and leaving Tor are highly cor-
related. An adversary on the path at both ends can then
perform traffic correlation analysis on the packet traces to
deanonymize the clients.
Figure 5: The Tor network.
3.2 Routing Attacks on Anonymity Systems
Traditional attacks from network-level adversaries focus
on passive adversaries who are already on the paths to ob-
serve Tor traffic. However, adversaries can exploit active
routing attacks to strategically intercept Tor traffic, enabling
on-demand and targeted attacks [37].
Figure 6 illustrates the attack. AS3 (adversary) only sees
traffic between the exit and the web server, and needs to
intercept the traffic between the client and the entry relay.
It also needs to keep the connection alive in order to capture
sufficient traffic for the correlation analysis, i.e., perform an
interception attack. AS3 announces an equally-specific pre-
fix of the target prefix which covers the entry relay, while
maintaining a valid path (via AS5) to the victim AS1. Con-
sequently, traffic from the client gets routed to the adversary
AS3, which forwards the traffic to AS1 to keep the connec-
tion alive. Similar attacks can be performed to intercept the
exit-server connection as well, if the adversary is not already
on the path.
The attacks become more threatening given that seeing
either direction of the traffic is sufficient, which opens the
door to more adversaries. Figure 7 illustrates the scenario
where the user downloads a file from the web server. The
adversary performs an interception attack on the entry relay
and only sees one direction of the traffic (client to entry
relay), which are mostly TCP ACK packets. The adversaries
then use the sequence and acknowledgment numbers from
the TCP header (unencrypted) to determine the sizes of the
data packets traveling in the other direction.
The attack was successfully demonstrated on the live Tor
network (ethically), by having 50 Tor clients download files
from 50 web servers via an entry relay under a prefix con-
trolled by the researchers [37]. Routing announcements were
propagated through the PEERING testbed [33], and an in-
terception attack was launched on the prefix covering the
entry relay. No real user was affected during the attack.
The attack deanonymized 90% of the clients in less than
five minutes.
3.3 Defenses to Protect Anonymity
Many existing defenses cannot sufficiently detect or pre-
vent such interception attacks. Recent works have proposed
application-layer defenses for Tor [36,38].
Proactive defense via relay selection. Sun et al. [36]
proposed a new relay selection algorithm to protect the con-
nection between a Tor client and the entry relay. This algo-
rithm defends against equally-specific prefix attacks on entry
relays, where the effect is localized and only clients in cer-
tain locations will get affected The localized effect opens up
the possibility for clients to stay unaffected by choosing the
relay wisely and proactively before any attack happens. The
Figure 6: An adversary (AS3) launches an interception attack on the entry relay in AS1 and consequently observes the
client-entry traffic in addition to exit-server traffic.
Figure 7: The adversary may only see one direction of the
traffic but can still perform asymmetric traffic analysis to
deanonymize users.
algorithm maximizes the probability of clients being unaf-
fected by attacks based on the topological locations of the
clients and the relays. It successfully improves the proba-
bility by 36% on average (up to 166% for certain Tor client
locations).
Reactive defense via monitoring. To complement the
proactive defense, Sun et. al. proposed a monitoring sys-
tem on routing activities for Tor relays. The system uses
new detection techniques such as time-based and frequency-
based heuristics, specifically tuned for Tor. The authors
showed that most BGP updates involving a Tor relay are
only announced by a single AS (across all updates), effec-
tively differentiating the announcements made by adversary
ASes who never announced the prefix in the past. Tan et
al. [38] also proposed a data-plane detection approach that
periodically runs traceroute to detect longest-prefix attacks
and update Tor relay descriptors upon anomaly detection,
so that Tor clients can pick entry relays correspondingly.
4. CERTIFICATE AUTHORITIES
The Public Key Infrastructure is the foundation for se-
curing online communications. Digital certificates are is-
sued by trusted certificate authorities (CAs) to domain own-
ers, verifying the ownership of a domain. Internet users
trust a domain with encrypted communications, such as
bank websites, only if a valid certificate signed by a CA
is presented. This mechanism effectively prevents Man-In-
The-Middle (MITM) attacks that can have disastrous con-
Figure 8: BGP attack on domain control verification.
sequences, such as stealing users’ financial information.
However, the certificate issuance process is itself vulnera-
ble to routing attacks, allowing network-level adversaries to
obtain trusted digital certificates for any victim domain [18].
These attacks have significant consequences for the integrity
and privacy of online communications, as adversaries can use
fraudulently obtained digital certificates to bypass the pro-
tection offered by encryption and launch man-in-the-middle
attacks against critical communications.
4.1 How Certificate Authorities Work
Domain control verification is a crucial process for domain
owners to obtain digital certificates from CAs. Domain own-
ers approach a CA to request a digital certificate, and the
CA responds with a challenge that requires the owners to
demonstrate control of an important network resource (e.g.,
a website or email address) associated with the domain. Fig-
ure 8 illustrates HTTP verification where the CA requires
the domain owner to upload a document to a well-known di-
rectory on its web server and verify the upload over HTTP.
Upon completion of the challenge, the CA issues the digital
certificate to the domain owner.
4.2 Routing Attacks on Digital Certificates
The domain control verification process creates a vulner-
ability to adversaries who can fake control of the network
Let’s
Encrypt
GoDaddy Comodo Symantec GlobalSign
Time
to issue
certificate
35s <10min 51s 6min 4min
Human
Interac-
tion
No No No No No
Multiple
Vantage
Points
No1 No No No No
Validation
Method
Attacked
HTTP HTTP Email Email Email
Table 1: Five CAs were attacked and obtained certificates
from. All were automated and none had any defenses against
BGP attacks.
resources. Network-level adversaries can use routing at-
tacks to hijack or intercept the traffic to the victim’s do-
main such that the CA’s request is routed to the adversaries
instead [18] (step (5) in Figure 8). Adversaries can then an-
swer the CA’s HTTP request in step (6) and subsequently
obtain a signed digital certificate from the CA for the victim
domain. The attacks were successfully demonstrated in the
real world, ethically [18]. The attacked domains were run
on IP prefixes controlled by the researchers and had no real
users or services. The adversary successfully obtained cer-
tificates for the victim domain from five top CAs in as little
as 35 seconds (Table 1).
This work highlights the significant damage of routing at-
tacks that can compromise the foundation of secure online
communications, and shows the urgent need for practical de-
fenses. Furthermore, the attacks also apply to other systems
that require demonstration of control on certain resources
via verification requests, such as email verifications. The
communication with the mail server can be hijacked or in-
tercepted, and there is still a non-negligible amount of emails
that are unencrypted (e.g., less than 20% of the emails from
“icicibank.com”, a bank website, are encrypted [2]).
4.3 Defenses to Protect Digital Certificates
Many currently deployed defenses do not sufficiently pro-
tect digital certificates. Given the relatively short time re-
quired to obtain a fraudulent certificate, adversaries can get
a certificate before the attack is mitigated, even if it is de-
tected by monitoring systems. In addition, adversaries can
potentially obtain a malicious certificate using only local-
ized routing attacks that do not affect a large portion of
the Internet. If a domain does not have a CAA DNS record
(which is currently true of the vast majority of domains [32]),
any CA is authorized to sign a certificate for that domain.
Thus, adversaries only need to affect the route between one
(of several hundred) CAs and the target domain to obtain a
fraudulent certificate.
Birge-Lee et al. [18] recently proposed two practical application-
layer defenses. (1) Multiple Vantage Point Verification: build-
ing on the key insight that routing attacks may be localized,
CAs can significantly decrease their vulnerability to attacks
by performing domain verification from multiple vantage
points and suspend certificate issuance in the case of in-
1No vantage points were deployed at time of attack. Let’s
Encrypt has since deployed multiple vantage point verifica-
tion [14].
consistent validation results. By adding only one additional
vantage point, the probability of catching a localized routing
attack on a domain increases from 61% to 84%. By having
two additional vantage points, the probability of catching
the attack reaches over 90% for 74% of the 1.8 million do-
mains in the study. (2) BGP monitoring with route age
heuristics: building on the key insight that anomalous and
suspicious routing announcements are usually short-lived,
CAs can require the routes to the domains to be active for
a minimum time threshold before signing a certificate. This
defense would force attacks to be active for over 30 hours
before the routes can be used to obtain a bogus certificate.
Both defenses only require minimal deployment effort by
the CAs with no change needed from domain owners or the
routing infrastructure.
Multiple vantage point verification has gained significant
traction. Let’s Encrypt, the world’s largest CA, has de-
ployed multiple vantage point verification [14]. Furthermore,
the prominent CDN CloudFlare has developed an API for
CAs to perform multiple vantage point verification using its
network [11].
5. THE BITCOIN NETWORK
Bitcoin is the most widely-used cryptocurrency to date
with over 42 million users [15]. However, network-level ad-
versaries can launch routing attacks to partition the bit-
coin network, effectively preventing the system from reach-
ing consensus [17]. Besides Bitcoin, this attack is generally
applicable to many peer-to-peer networks and is particularly
dangerous against blockchain systems.
5.1 How Bitcoin Works
Bitcoin is a peer-to-peer network in which nodes use con-
sensus mechanisms to jointly agree on a (distributed) log of
all the transactions that ever happened. This log is called
the blockchain because it is composed of an ordered list
(chain) of grouped transactions (blocks).
Special nodes, known as wallets, are responsible for orig-
inating transactions and propagating them in the network
using a gossip protocol. A different set of nodes, known as
miners, are responsible for verifying the most recent trans-
actions, grouping them in a block, and appending this block
to the blockchain. To do so, the miners need to solve a pe-
riodic puzzle whose complexity is automatically adapted to
the computational power of the miners in the network.
Every time a miner creates a block, it broadcasts it to all
the nodes in the network and receives freshly-mined bitcoins.
Besides the most recent transactions, the block contains a
proof-of-work (a solution to the puzzle) that each node can
independently verify before propagating the block further.
In Figure 9a, node n “mines” a block which is then broad-
casted hop-by-hop in the network.
As miners work concurrently, several of them may find a
block at nearly the same time. These blocks effectively cre-
ate “forks” in the blockchain, i.e., different versions of the
blockchain. The conflicts are eventually resolved as subse-
quent blocks are appended to each chain and one of them
becomes longer. In this case, the network automatically
discards the shorter chains, effectively discarding the corre-
sponding blocks together with the miner’s revenues.
5.2 Routing Attacks on Consensus
Network-level adversaries can perform routing attacks on
(a) New blocks mined by bitcoin nodes in different ASes are
propagated to the whole network.
(b) The attacker hijacks all prefixes pertaining to bitcoin
nodes in the gray zone. Consequently, blocks mined by nodes
in the gray zone won’t be propagated further, which effectively
isolates the gray zone.
Figure 9
bitcoin to partition the set of nodes into two (or more) dis-
joint components [17]. Consequently, the attacks disrupt the
ability of the entire network to reach consensus. The adver-
sary must divert and cut all the connections connecting the
various components together. To do so, the adversary can
perform an interception attack by hijacking the IP prefixes
of each component and selectively dropping the connections
crossing the components, while leaving the internal connec-
tions (within a component) untouched.
In Figure 9b, the adversary hijacks all prefixes pertaining
to bitcoin nodes in the gray zone. Having gained control
over the traffic towards these nodes (red lines), the adversary
drops the connections between the clients that are within the
gray zone and outside it, effectively creating a partition.
The impact of partition attacks is worrying. First, a par-
tition attack can act as a denial-of-service attack: clients
can neither properly propagate the corresponding transac-
tions, nor verify the ownership of funds. Second, a partition
attack can lead to high revenue loss for the miners: once the
network reconnects, the shortest chain(s) will be discarded,
permanently depriving miners of their rewards.
5.3 Defenses to Protect the Bitcoin Consensus
Apostolaki et al. [16] recently proposed SABRE to pro-
tect bitcoin from partition attacks. SABRE is an overlay
network, composed of a small set of special bitcoin clients
(relays) that receive, verify, and propagate blocks. Regular
bitcoin clients can connect to one or more relays in addi-
tion to their regular connections. During a partition attack,
SABRE relays stay connected to each other and to many
bitcoin clients, allowing block propagation among the other-
wise disconnected components. In Figure 10b, while clients
in the gray zone are isolated from the rest of the network,
a block mined by node n is propagated via the relay nodes
(colored in orange) to the rest of the network.
SABRE achieves this by strategically choosing the ASes
in which to host relay nodes. The key insight is that some
ASes, such as those without customers, are naturally pro-
tected against routing attacks. By hosting relays in these
ASes, SABRE can therefore maintain its connectivity and
its ability to propagate blocks on behalf of bitcoin clients,
even in the presence of routing attacks. Note that a bitcoin
client only requires one unhindered connection to a SABRE
relay to be protected.
In the SABRE network shown in Figure 10a, three ASes
(ASB, ASC, ASD) are selected to host the relay nodes,
which directly peer with each other and have no customer
ASes. During routing attacks, the relay nodes stay con-
nected to each other. For instance, if ASG (provider of
ASC) announces the prefix of ASB, ASC would still pre-
fer the route to ASB since it’s via a peer. Additionally, all
bitcoin clients keep at least one connection to the relay net-
work during the attack. Even nodes such as node q which
loses one of the connections to the relay network due to the
attack, stays connected via another relay node.
6. DISCUSSION
We demonstrated the emerging threats of routing attacks
to critical applications. Next, we outline lessons learned
from the three applications, and discuss the importance of
developing solutions at both the application and network
layers.
6.1 For Application Developers
The most important takeaway is the significant impact of
routing (in)security on Internet applications. When securing
the application layer in isolation becomes hard to achieve,
we should think about cross-layer solutions that take into
account routing properties at the network layer.
We outline two routing properties that are the key insights
in building application-layer defenses: (i) localized attack :
attack announcements may not be propagated and visible
to the whole Internet, and stealthy adversaries can carefully
craft announcements to control propagation and only target
certain regions; (ii) attack resilience: ASes that receive the
attack announcement may not be affected, i.e., not favoring
the malicious path and hence being “resilient” to the attack.
This depends on the routing preferences, e.g., if an AS re-
ceives the attack announcement from a provider while the
legitimate path is through a peer, the AS will still prefer the
legitimate path.
These two simple routing properties lead to three gener-
alizable application-layer defenses shown in Figure 11.
(a) Relay nodes are hosted in ASes that have no customer
ASes and compose connected graph of direct peering links.
Bitcoin clients connect to at least one relay node.
(b) While routing attacks isolate the gray zone from the rest
of the bitcoin network, blocks mined in the gray zone are
propagated via relay nodes in the overlay SABRE network.
Figure 10
Figure 11: Two routing properties serve as the key insights
in developing application-layer defenses.
Deploy multiple vantage points. Initiating connec-
tions from multiple vantage points increases the likelihood of
detecting and circumventing a localized attack. Certificate
Authorities can perform domain control verification from
multiple vantage points to ensure that routes to the desti-
nation are consistent. This approach generalizes to a broad
set of verification processes, where verifications from multi-
ple sources would help lower the success of an attack and
significantly increase the cost to an adversary. BGP moni-
toring systems also benefit from having more comprehensive
data through multiple vantage points to detect stealthy at-
tack.
Choose resilient nodes. Applications can strategically
choose nodes/servers that are the most resilient to attacks.
Tor clients may choose an entry relay that maximizes the
probability of being resilient given the AS locations of the
client and the relay. Bitcoin may choose relay nodes in cer-
tain ASes (e.g., peer AS without customers) to avoid being
affected by attacks. The specific implementation can vary
based on the need of the applications, and may even bring
in RPKI as a criteria in choosing resilient nodes.
Build an overlay network. This approach can help
mitigate some effects of routing attacks, e.g., partitioning
Bitcoin nodes, by providing alternative routes. It can be
more effective when combined with“choosing resilient nodes”,
where the nodes in the overlay are carefully chosen to max-
imize the resilience to attacks. Bitcoin is an example appli-
cation that benefits from an overlay to mitigate partitioning
attacks, but the approach is generally applicable to many
peer-to-peer networks.
6.2 For Network Operators
While application-layer defenses can provide immediate
protections, we should also push for large-scale deployment
of general defenses against sophisticated routing attacks. We
recommend that ASes (i) adopt best practices outlined in the
MANRS [13] project, (ii) accelerate the adoption of RPKI by
publishing ROAs and performing Route Origin Validation
(ROV), and (iii) build consensus on a pathway to solving
routing security issues (including full path security) once
and for all.
Securing all 800K prefixes and 67K ASes [12] seems like
an impossible task. However, only a small portion of the
prefixes play a heavy role in each application. For instance,
only around 1100 ASes have Tor relays hosted on their pre-
fixes, and one AS alone carries 23% of all Tor traffic [36].
Furthermore, in digital certificate issuance, a handful of cer-
tificate authorities issue the vast majority of certificates, and
the domains are largely hosted on a few cloud and CDN
providers (e.g., five ASes including SquareSpace and Ama-
zon host nearly half of the domains [18]). Finally, only 5
ASes host one third of all Bitcoin clients [1], while 50% of
all mining power is hosted in less that 100 prefixes [17]. If a
few thousand ASes can take major steps to deploy routing
security, the applications will receive tremendous benefits.
In addition, popular applications—and their users—can
help incentivize the deployment of routing security solutions
by the actions they take, while ensuring the applications’ se-
curity/privacy goals. For instance, Tor could favor certain
relays that are hosted on authenticated prefixes, and domain
owners could favor cloud hosting services that provide origin
validations and favor certificate authorities hosted on au-
thenticated prefixes. Similarly, miners could prefer hosting
their infrastructure in ASes that provide origin validation,
while regular client could prefer to connect to peers hosted
on authenticated prefixes. These steps may help motivate
network operators to validate their prefixes to offer better
service to their customers, and eventually lead to a more
secure routing infrastructure.
7. CONCLUSION
Often times, we focus on individual layers in isolation. In
neglecting routing (in)security, application developers un-
derestimate the risks for their users. In focusing on avail-
ability threats, network operators underestimate the risks
to Internet applications. By demonstrating the dire conse-
quences of routing attacks on Internet applications, we stress
the importance of cross-layer awareness and the need to de-
ploy both application-layer and network-layer solutions.
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